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ETHICS AND REALITY
BY T. SWANN HARDING
''T^HE field of ethics and morals seems very chaotic to one trained
-L in science. In ^{fite of the fact that systems of ethics are many
and varied it is a peculiar fact that the majority of people the wide
world over are quite well agreed as to the good in certain acts and
the bad in certain others. Moreover this agreement has existed for
some centuries. This suggests at once that there are rules at work
in the sphere of ethics and morals (juite as surely as in that of phys-
ics, and that the\' are probably as true on the a\erage, or statisticall}-,
as the rules governing the actions of atoms and molecules. It also
suggests that there could be formulated a system of ethics as "true"'
for its specific reality as systems of phwsics are for their particular
reality. Quite probably several such pragmatically "true"" sxstems
could be formulated, each Cjuite useful, and dozens of quite useless
fictional systems could be altogether eliminated.
In America we are especially interested in crime. A\ e speak
proudly of our crime waves and we have a crime commission to
investigate them. Their existence is very real and }et our method
of dealing with them is still, in man_\' instances, very primitive. This
becomes apparent in /// Prison b\' Kate O'EIare, a book no one
should read who cherishes fictions more than hypotheses dealing
\\ith realitw ( )d(ll\' enough, it describes as still existing in American
prisons abuses which the Webbs (in their Englisli Prisons Under
Local Government) considered atrocious in English prisons of the
seventeenth century. I refer particular! \- to the attendants" habits
of mulcting and defrauding prisoners of money and sustenance
illegall}'. It is also still possible for a person to be convicted of
some infraction of social custom—for social custom interprets law"
and reading the Constitution or the Bible in public may or may not
be illegal, depending upon momentary social customs—and ulti-
matel}' sent to prison. Here this person may actually be the victim
of anti-social acts much worse than those which brought about in-
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carceration and may also be compelled to break certain laws more
fundamental than those whose infraction broug'ht about im])rison-
ment. \"er_\' curious isn't it?
For instance contract labor ma_\- be i)rohibited in the prisons of
a certain state. That state and others ma_\- also ha\e laws saying
that all prison-made goods must be clearl\- labeled as such. The
prisoner may, however, be so farmed out to an o\'erall manufacturer
in a distant state that he or she gets fifty cents to a dollar a month
for work worth S5 a day and the profits go not to the federal go\-
ernment nor to the state, but to the contractor. bTu'thermore he
or she ma}' be compelled to sew labels into finished garments which
insist the_\' were producetl at the factories of industrialists several
hundred miles away; these prison products are then sold as ])rivately
manufactured, and quite illegall}-. Finally, the i)risoner ma_\' be
beaten or assulted ; he may be, and often is, exposed carelessl\- to
infection b_\' the most awful diseases, and he leaves the institution.
willy nilly. a complete adept at all forms of criminal technic whether
he has learned anything else or not.
The Xational Crime Commission has. in its preliminar_\- reports.
observed that such })rison abuses still exist in the Cnited States on
a very considerable scale. Hut, if we wished, we might consider a
step still earlier in the process—that of "responsibilit}" which is a
word that covers a fiction, h'or we condemn and punish if the
person committing an anti-social act was "responsible"" for his action
whereas, in realitx', responsil:)ilit_\' is itself established empirically in
each case and, from a scientific standpoint, means exactly nothing.
For there are onl\- three kinds of criminals: 1. The chronically and
incurabh' mischievous who should be intelligently restrained for the
rest of their natural lives; 2. the psxchic and glandular types, or
those with other physiological lesion>, who can be cured b_\' medical
therapy and released as entirel}- new characters ; 3. the normals who,
under great stress, make an isolated detour into crime, who should
be compelled to make civil restitution and discharged in care of
their "conscience,"" ( for they ha\e a something that gives them the
very de\-il the rest of their lives i after it has been determined
medically and ps_\-cho^ogically that they are i)erfectly normal.
That in itself is all ver}' interesting. The present fiction is that
the person performed an anti-social act. He must be punished; he
must make retribution to society, in order to deter others, or he must
at least be reformed. The fact is that in many prisons he is mis-
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treated, nothing is done to change his social habits for the better,
he is exposed to infection, compelled to break other laws more
fundamental than those he broke outside prison, and sent forth
bitter and psychopathic. Higher prison officials are still frequently
appointed as political favors ; lower officials are underpaid and un-
intelligent; all are very often entirely untrained. We are not by
innate nature maliciously savage people. Just why do we do such
things as have been described ? Just why do we persist in believing
in fictions so manifest when facts are so easily ascertainable? I
rather think Ave have something to learn from cjuite non-criminal
people in their ordinary, everyday habits of conduct, and I want
to adduce three examples, which may seem trivial, but which may
also yield considerable information upon examination and analysis.
The other morning a woman burst in upon me quite radiant be-
cause her daughter had won a rifle contest in college ; she was with
the winning team and she also made a high record personally. The
mother's enthusiasm seemed to me at first exceedingly pernicious,
later only somewhat sillv. Aly first feeling was to become indignant
and sermonize—i.e. to assume the inherent inerrancy of mv views,
arrived at after long and devious study, and their supreme right to
triumph over hers when expressed emotionally. For the shooting of
guns and marksmanship have to me many connotations of value
which they do not have to the superficial and quite innocently and
ignorantly frivolous woman who asked me to share her enthusiasm.
The essential utility of guns is to kill. They may be used to
kill birds or animals, but few of us need them for that purpose.
The only widespread need we could ever have would be for the
killing of human beings. This brings up the specter of war, or of
police violence, and the possibility that complete familiarity with
firearms will very probably develop in anyone a psychological state
quite less inimical to bloodshed than that of a person like myself
who never touched a firearm, if I remember correctly. In short the
values evolved by long and arduous study arose in me. liut there
was no time to explain all of that. It would have taken me several
hours even had the woman been disposed to listen. She would then
have been unable to understand because she had not been accustomed
to think ; she took current fictions at* face value. For me to become
emotionally disdainful and arrogantly seek to enforce m\' views
would have been useless. What I actually did was make some very
silly remark to the eftect that young women were apparently trained
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in college these days to make them capable of dealing effectively
with their husbands somewhat later.
A second instance: Two gentlemen sat behind me on the street-
car this morning talking of a third man whose name should, I sup-
pose, be Chaos. They were discussing what they called "efficiency"
and "svstem" and it became quite apparent that Chaos was one of
these helter-skelter persons who had no place for anything and
everAthing was somewhere else. The\- agreed on that. But they
did not get much further. For within five minutes it developed
that one of them. A, was himself far more precise than the other, Tj.
When A began to tell exactly- how he did things B soon began in-
terrupting to show where this or that practice was not systematic,
was not efficient, but was actually a fettering bad habit. The argu-
ment rapidly became passionate and it ended with A's departure
from the car. Nothing at all had been accomplished except a display
of bad temper.
Bv third instance concerns a married couple who sat across from
me recentlv in a shoe store. The woman was buying two pairs of
shoes. The man quite apparentl\- had no objection to that. In fact
I knew him quite well and I knew his wife. He was the kind of
man who thought of things literary first and everything else there-
after. She was the kind of woman who would think of shoes or a
dress first and might think of things intellectual secondl}'. Quite
suddenly he remembered something and withdrew from his brief-
case a magazine containing an article of his which had just appeared
so illustrated as great!}- to plea>e him. Intoxicated with his interest
and anxious to show the illustrations to her he burst in, at a moment
the shoe salesman had turned aside, and brought the article to her
attention.
The result was explosive. She became very indignant and in
tones quite audible to me some ten feet away told him that he was
ridiculously ignorant and rude and would never learn an}- manners.
She was interested in shoes and interviewing a salesman whereupon
he, like a child, rudely interrupted. The salesman meantime had
turned to the couple and viewed the spectacle with astonishment.
The husband, however, laughed, shrugged his shoulders as one
would to some irritable child, put the article away and assumed a
gentlemanly interest in shoes again. A moment later, entirel}- due to
his adroit handling of the situation, the woman was quite herself
and they were rather merrily discussing shoes. Here we have a
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miniature study of an element which could completely disrupt a
marriage except for the fact that the husband, and I happen in this
instance to know both parties to the conversation very well, has his
emotions so well disciplined that he does not allow them to go out
on parade on matters of no particular intellectual consequence.
Reviewing these trivial instances more abstractly what do we
find? First they are important because they and millions like them,
are part and parcel of the reality of everyday human behavior and
conduct. From such simplicities spring later complexities like war
spirit, personal and group contention, social misunderstandings,
broken homes, and crimes. Secondly, three needs stand forth before
we can formulate a new and scientific ethical and moral system.
These are : Firsts more pure, unindoctrinated facts ; more knowl-
edge. For had the woman in instance one known enough to realize
all the implications of what her daughter was doing, to evaluate
the phenomena of reality more properl}-, and to visualize conse-
quences by a process of imaginative abstract thought based, however,
on knowledge, she might have acted difl:erently. The misfortune
remains that a state university thoughtlessly considers it acts upon
a sound psychological and intellectual principle when it inculcates
marksmanship.
The second need is that for the meticulous and rigorous defini-
tion of terms. The two men who argued had no fixed definition for
the wTjrds "svstem" and "efticienc}." Probabl}- old Chaos himself
thought he was quite systematic in Walt Whitman's notoriousl}-
unsvstematic waw or in the manner of literary gentlemen who can
find nothing at all after prim ])eople straighten up their studies.
However, it would be possible to go fact-finding and perhaps to
discover what s_\stem was best in this or that office, how much
s}-stem enabled it to function more elficiently and just where su]jer-
fiuous s}'stem became an impediment. Facts would be needed first
;
then careful and precise definition of terms so that ever\()ne in-
terested could understand jierfectly the ideas for which certain \\(jrd
sxmbols stood.
Hence a third thing is needed. It is a sort of personal thing and
it involves emotional discipline on the one hand and, on the other,
a reluctance to interpret our own sincere private opinions, or the
basic postulates which we happen to respect, as indiscriminate!}'
good for all and sundry. The woman who bought shoes had a dif-
ferent standard of values from that of her husband: this quite
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naturall}- involved a different standard of conduct and a different
interpretation of what constitutes bad conduct—rudeness in this
case. She called her husband ignorant and rude. She was ver_\-
much irritated at the time. She was in such an emotional ])et that
she was psxchologically incai)al)le of reasoning dispassionately or
accurately, b^or she knew that her husband was not onl\' highly-
educated—he had advanced universit\- degrees: but he was widelv
known and recognized as a profound scholar, extraordinarih- in-
formed on social questions.
Now, having been irritated into a i)et the woman became rude
through lack of emotional disciidine. ( irant, for sake of argument,
that her husband's action was mildl\- rude ; it had a powerful intel-
lectual drive behind it; he had a subject of great human imj^ortance
in mind and his off'ense was a minor infraction of courtesw llers
was public, sustained, and emphatic. lUit worse still she rationalized
her own irritation and rudeness as the just wrath of a highly culti-
vated lad}' at the boorishness of an unmannerh- clown. This argued
that her standard was the best and the onl_\- possible standard of
values; that she had a perfect right to impose it on other people
because "all decent people" ( and was she not their accredited rep-
resentative ? ) behaved in accordance therewith. Her husband's emo-
tions were under such complete control that he neither ridiculed the
onslaught nor rei)lied in kind. He was so tactful that it disappeared
without leaving a ripple and he acted thus first because he had
acquaintance with a wide field of knowledge about human behavior,
and secondl}' because he knew it would be absurd for him, in turn,
to set up his personal conduct and emotional reactions as the
standard of right for anyone—especiall\- for his wife!
But, }ou say, this is silly. This is i)ett_\'. 'Jdiese are mere casual
individuals and insignificant incidents of no im])ort. .Admitting
that they indicate some ethical confusion in the minds of individuals,
there is an ethical s\'stem universally recognized as correct antl
people should be urged to tr\- and lixe in accordance therewith.
Right there I diff'er. I contend that the reason people are so pettish,
so confused^ so ignoranth' superficial, or so sincerely perj)lexed is
because we have not taken the trouble to formulate any scientific
system of ethics based upon the facts of reality as at present
ascertainable. I admit that ethical theories of conduct must in any
case be based upon a postulate. I even admit that you can base them
on a varied assortment of mutually antipathetic postulates and. by
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sufficiently disregarding your beliefs in fiction when you are in
contact with an imperious bit of reality, live about the same "good"
life in any case. Bvit I argue that this sort of thing is itself helter-
skelter and chaotic and that we owe it to ourselves to formulate a
scientific system of ethics.
Consider very briefly the extant ethical systems. What postu-
lates are assumed by various ethical systems—very, very respectable
systems too—in order to build good lives thereupon? One is the
existence of a god, of one sort or another, who makes demands of
one sort or another. This postulate is secure and helpful so long as
societies are primitive and homogenous and so long as the god is
defined cjuite precisely by the group as a whole, and a vast majority
of the group as individuals concur the rightness of the definition.
In a society such as ours where god is defined so utterly dift'erently
by so many individuals or groups, this postulate is valueless. It
amounts to no more than asking the god to ratify our own highest
notion of what ought to be, which is a phrase-garb used to protect
errant and anemic fictions from the bleak winds of reality.
We may revert to conscientious sentimentalism. W^e may take
as our basic postulate some such sentiment as pity, sympathy, al-
truism, unselfishness or the pious and fervid affirmation of a funda-
mental principle from which practical morality certainly ought to
be deduced. But what has this to do with the teeming reality which
surrounds us? We may take Kant's imperative and seek so to act
that things will become better by our acting so, but to refrain from
acts which would make things worse if everyone committed them.
But what do we mean by better and worse? We may s^y with him
that the good will is that which acts out of respect for moral law
and may therefore alone be held to be morally good, which is a
charming verbal rondelet but seems somehow to lack grasp on
reality. We may make all sorts of a priori rules ; we may invoke
hedonism or utilitarianism ; we may actually postulate a principle in
reverse to all that is usually considered good and moral and deduce
therefrom some system, like that which rules a gang, which is singu-
larly ethical within a restricted group.
W^e need go no further than the law to discover how much at
sea we really are in such matters. I perform a certain act. I hap-
pen to be seen and apprehended. I happen to be relatively poor.
I am therefore brought to trial for a penitentiary oft'ense. I am to
be judged by a learned judge and a jury of my peers. In what does
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this justice inhere? How is the case decided? Xonnally in one of
two ways, ignoring as incidental to any case at law the emotional
and fact-obfuscating antics of law}ers of sorts who seek to raise
doubts, confuse and mislead. Way number one consists in citing
precedents. The lawyers go back to look for cases like mine and
to discover what was done about such cases, ^'et there never was
in the history of the world a case just like mine though the decision
is rendered in terms of that case which may have been tried a decade
or two ago under entirely ditTerent circumstances. (Remember al-
ways that under the same law reading the Constitution in public
sometimes is and sometimes is not criminal.) Actuall\- the case
cited as precedent had nothing whatever to do with me standing
here and now before a judge for this particular offense. It is a
mere fiction to assume that it could have an_\thing to do with my
case which cannot be subsumed under it without assviming a decision
in advance, a contingency the whole absurd process has been invoked
to avoid.
Process number two is that of deliberately making some impos-
ing fundamental postulate in resounding and impressive terms and
in asserting that my action is inimical to social stability. Thus,
the law being cjuite the same in each case, it ma_\' at one time be
stated by the judge that the reading of the Constitution by the
prisoner at the bar constituted an incendiary act inimical to society
and that acts inimical to societ}' must be penalized by so many years
in the penitentiar}- ; at another time it may be stated that the innocent
reading of the Constitution does not constiute an act inimical to
society and that anyway it is a fundamental postulate in this countr}-
that we have freedom of speech and expression at all times—there-
fore the prisoner should be dismissed and perhaps eulogized.
Neither legal process seeks to interrogate the facts of reality, to
ascertain all the particulars relevant to this specific event and to
arrive at a dispassionatel}' scientific judgment on the basis of those
facts. True enough this process is rendered difficult in the absence
of some well-formulated system of rational ethics. Just that is what
is needed and leading thinkers recognize this. Thus we find White-
head saying in Process and Reality'
"The actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully
definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of
moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the
data, and by the categoreal conditions of concrescence."
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Whitehead is tn'ing to write Hke a philosopher and it is a fiction
among them that the simplest truths must be stated in the most
forbidding language, but he evident!}' means about what I have iust
said above. John Dewey, who shares the fiction that confused
verbiage is a great philosophic advantage, sa\s this in writing on
'Individualism, Old and New" in The Xcw Republic for Februarx'
5, 1930 (p. 296) :
hidividuals will refind themselves only as their ideas and ideals are brought
into harmony with the realities of the corporate age in which they act. The
task of attaining this harmony is not an easy one. But it is more negative than
it seems, more negative than positive. If we could inhibit the principles and
standards that are merely traditional, if we could slough off the opinions that
have no living relationship to the situations in which we live, the unavowed
forces that now work upon us unconsciously but unremittingly would have
a chance to build minds after their own pattern, and individuals would, in
consequence, tind themselves in possession of objects to which imagination
and emotion could stably attach themselves.
Again this needs translation. For one impediment to clear think-
ing on the part of the masses is that its thinkers have quite uni-
versally invested belief in the fiction that fundamental truths cannot
be expressed simply, perhaps for fear that being too easil}' under-
stood the>' will not win respect. However, Dewey must mean that
our ethical system should be in harmon}- with the reality of the age
in which we now live. Shaw (in his I iitclli(/ciit iroiinui's Guide)
naturally expressed the idea much more plainly He simply said :
The reason we are in such a mess at present is that our governments
are trying to carry on with a set of beliefs that belong to bygone phases of
science and extinct civilizations. Imagine going to Moses or Mahomet for a
code to regulate the modern money market.
Where does this leave us? As omniscient beings, when we re-
gard molecules, we observe that they follow certain statistical rules
and we formulate a system of physics designed to explain what
molecules do. I*ut all molecules do not do what we sa_\' they do ;
however, enough of them follow our propositions for us to sa_\' that
the\- are in statistical agreement with our scientific hypotheses. In
the social sciences, however, we are not omniscient beings. A\'e are
rather curious, precocious molecules of a gas seeking objectivel}- to
determine the plnsical laws which statistically govern the gas of
which we ourselves form an intimate part at the time. We tr_\- to
be objective, but we remain human. If we find a statistical law
which we do not happen to follow we say it is not "right" even
though the vast majority of molecules do follow it. We must con-
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trol our emotions and tr\- to realize that all human molecules do not
necessarily do what we do. Hence we must look to scientists, who
try very hard to be objective, to study these questions and, using the
same scientific method they use in physics, formulate an ethical sys-
tem that has realitw
How far can our American scientists, who do delve into general
and social problems, be expected to make scientific method under-
stood to the masses and to advise its use in the solution of ethical
problems? I can cite but one here. However, he is a leading
scientist-sermonizer on public questions and his scientific reputation
is unassailable. Of his frequent sermons I })ick the one on "Alleged
Sins of Science" which appeared in February, 1930, Scrvbncrs.
Herein he defends science against all charges of having done evil.
He is unwilling to admit, for instance, that science helped cause the
Great War and helped make it horrible. Yet he has done nothing
of which I am aware to formulate a s\stem of scientific ethics
which would make war anachronistic. Instead he comes out at
this late date for the Golden Rule and greets with joy increased
church membership. He takes a fling at loose morals and at the
new art and literary forms. The gist of his attitude may be found
in this sentence
:
"Rather does the scientist join with the psalmist of thousands of years
ago in reverently proclaiming 'the Heavens declare the glory of God and the
Firmament sheweth his handiwork.' The God of Science is the spirit of
rational order and of orderly development, the integrating factor in the world
of atoms and of ether and of ideas and of duties and of intelligence. Ma-
terialism is surely not a sin of modern science."
This is nothing more nor less than an eftort to make old bottles
hold new wine and to preserve the pretended reality of what may
once have been a humanly helpful hypothesis but what is now an
antiquated fiction as a basic postulate for a system of ethics.
I turn from this to a statement of Prof. Albert Einstein which
appeared in the New York Tijiics during January-, 1930. It was in
part as follows
"It has now become a general recognized axiom that the giant armaments
of all nations are proving highly injurious to them collectively. I am even in-
clined to go a step further by the assertion that, under present-day conditions,
any one state would incur no appreciable risk by undertaking to disarm—
-
wholly regardless of the attitude of the other states. If such were not the
case it would be quite evident that the situation of such states as are unarmed
or only partially equipped for defense would be extremely difficult, dangerous,
and disadvantageous—a condition which is refuted by the facts. I am con-
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vinced that demonstrative references to armaments are but a weapon in the
hands of the factors interested in their production or in the maintenance and
development of a military system for financial or political-egotistic reasons. I
am firmly of the opinion that the educational effect of a first and genuine
achievement in the realm of disarmament would prove highly ef^cacious, be-
cause the succeeding second and third steps would then be immeasurably simpler
than the initial one ; this for the obvious reason that the first results of an
understanding would considerably weaken the familiar argument for national
security with which parliamentarians of all countries now permit themselves
to be intimidated. Armaments can never be viewed as an economic asset to
a state. They must ever remain the unproductive exploitation of men and
material and an encroachment on the economic reserves of a state through the
temporary conscription of men in the active periods of their lives—not to men-
tion tke moral impairment resulting from a preoccupation with the profession
of war and the moral processes of preparing a nation for it."
Here, by contrast with the American ^lilHkan, we find the words
of a socially conscious scientist who speaks from an intimate knowl-
edge of the facts of reahty and who makes no use whatever of
archaic fictions. The contrast is striking but I know no physical
scientist in America capable of such a statement, though a few
isolated social scientists might be cited. I know also that no one
would greet with greater covered or ouvert hostility an efi^ort to
appl\- scientific method to the social problems of today's reality than
the leaders and publications of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. Their constant admonition is go easy, do
not be controversial, do not be adversely critical, avoid acrimonious
issues—a curiously timid and secjuacious attitude indeed, and one
from which we have little to hope.
This brings me to a brief concluding statement which may be
inadequate but should serve to outline how a useful system of scien-
tific ethics could be evolved. Morals or ethics should be the sub-
ject of a system of causes deliberately created as the premises of
reasoning ; the conclusions deduced from these premises must co-
incide with the rules of practical morality the recognition of which
life has forced upon us, regardless of our past systems and postu-
lates, and which constitute the reality of ethics or morals. How
can we go about elaborating this system ?
First the rules of the moral reality of the here and now must
be clearly expressed. What are people doing and why are they
doing what they do ? How do psychopathic and economic factors
condition their conduct ? Such questions as these must be answered
statistically by the collection of more facts, more instances, more
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specific particulars which, in turn, will be more knowledge. Toda\-
too many social scientists follow the old technic of laying down a
priori postulates and then only collecting such facts as fit into their
preconceived fictions. The facts they do collect are therefore in-
doctrinated. Instead of this a vast number of fact-finding agencies
must collect and correlate facts in some such manner as the eco-
nomic bureaus of the Department of Agriculture do in order to
trace price trends or to find out how hard farm women reall\- work
and what they think.
This done, and it will take c|uite a while before it is scientifically
worth while to do anything else, the i»roduction of axioms and defi-
nitions will follow. Broad statements—laws which form h\])Otheses
—must be formulated and each word in them must be clearlv de-
fined. Their entire meaning must also be precise and their axioms
simply expressed, h^rom these ])remises ])roi)ositions must then be
derived. Had we had them in hand, for instance, in 1917 it would
have been quite possible for social scientists to have predicted with
fair accurac}' just what would ha]:)])en in the Tnited States after the
passage of the A'olstead Act. Had it been possible to present these
facts to the public in simple, non-h}Sterica] terms, an intelligent
vote might have been taken upon an abstraction which, in turn,
might have saved us from ma\- crimes and other (le\ious necessities
we had, instead, wastefully to learn from reality.
The propositions deduced from the premises must coincide with
the empirical moral rules of realit}-. If the sy^tem leads us to de-
duce that all parents will instincti\el\- treat their children kindh*
any juvenile court official can tell us how unreal and fictional our
s}'stem must be. for so many parents are deliberateh- \er\- cruel to
their own children. We must make sure of such coincidences and
keep them as perfect as possible. Then at last we >hall be in a
position to develop an entire theory by deducing from the initial
propositions, as in geometry-, all of the theorems those propositions
logically entail. These theorems must again be compared with the
facts of reality, as we go along. As long as facts and theorems are
compatible we are on the right track ; when the contrary is true we
must modify or replace our ethical system of causes, for it has then
become a pure fiction and can no longer have wide practical utility.
This process would still leave cjuite a number of systems of
ethics in existence from which to choose, each seeming logically
valid to about the same extent as the others. Dozens of svstems
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would, however, fortunately be eliminated at once and need occupy
us no more. They could be taught historically but not as valid in
present reality. Finally, that ethical system should be adopted which
was based on the smallest number of theorems and those most con-
sistently connected with the existing body of science as a whole.
This system would, like the present system of physics, explain the
phenomena of reality and would also be a time and labor saving
device by predicting future realities for us in various postulated
terms.
Reverting now to my original three "trivial" cases—what would
this mean? 1. It would necessitate getting more facts and broaden-
ing knowledge, because human beings are so constructed that they
automatically act differently when in possession of a large number
of facts than when in possession of very few, or of errors. 2. It
would necessitate the clear and concise definition of word-symbols,
axioms and propositions, so that like chemists when engaged in their
profession, we should all everywhere know what a person was
talking about when he said system, or good, or efficiency. 3. It
would necessitate sufficient discipline of the emotions to enable us
to refrain from interpreting our personal opinions as true for all
men, and to reason logically and dispassionately about the facts of
reality which confront us.
To accentuate our present ignorance I may cite an exam])]e that
appeared in the paper on the day I wrote this. We all know that a
great many people regard the high-priced workers in the building
trades as unethical gougers who overcharge and underwork. This
is a very common opinion and one often expressed without any
tangible evidence being cited. Actually it is a fiction. If the twenty
thousand skilled Iniilding mechanics of the District of Columbia
average two hundred da}s work a year apiece they may consider
themselves fortunate. It is improbable then that their average in-
come will be equal to the monetar_\- expenditure expert economists
declare to be necessary for the adequate support of a family of five.
Their work is seasonal and they have to charge whatever they can
get when they work in order to tide them over i)eriods of ill-timed
idleness. At the moment six thousand of them happen to be out of
work and the unions are endeavoring to write the five-day week into
every agreement made with employers in order to distribute the
quantity of work about more evenly among the workers and during
the vear. Here we have a situation in reality and certain labor
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unions have endeavored to meet it in the only way they know how
in view of the hmited number of facts available to them.
Actually the building industry is one of man}- industries and is
closely related thereto. We need a specitic number of new buildings
annually and we need a specitic number of mechanics to construct
them. We also need so much coal, so many pianos, so many loaves
of bread and so many fountain pens. However, nobody knows how
many of any of these things the country needs—what the relative
importance of various industries is, or exactly w^hat number of
workmen should be engaged in each. Perhaps we have too many
building mechanics as things are. \\'ho knows ? Perhaps their
effort to get a five-da}' week is sociall}-, economically, and ethically
expedient. Who knows? We have no code to guide us in such
matters because we lack a system of economics related to present-
day reality quite as surely as we lack a system of ethics. Therefore
many of us regard as maliciousl}- unethical a group of workmen
who are trying in the onl}- wa}- they know how to solve a pressing
economic problem. The method is imperfect because they do not
know all the facts, and no fact-finding agency has taken the trouble
to ascertain them and construct a rational system related to reality.
So we go ahead blindly and whether labor is "right" or "wrong" in
its action we cannot tell. Evidences of this self-same muddle-
headedness may be discerned in every branch of the social sciences,
—economics, politics, group conduct or ethics, and the only w^ay
we can get anywhere is by accumulating more knowledge, adopting
definite terms and axioms, and dispassionately building objective
logical systems statistically true to the reality of our time.
